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Introduction
Continuing a conversation we began at the Provoking Curriculum conference 
in Vancouver in 2003 (Lund, Panayotidis, Phelan, Smits, & Towers, 2003), we 
endeavour to think through what we sometimes experience as fragmenting 
narratives that shape our teaching, research, and everyday practices in our 
university. We focus particularly on the ethics of narrating difference and 
consider how it manifests itself in our educational work and how it affects 
our relationship to the Other. Through a series of individual narrations, we 
attempt to unsettle and develop notions of the transformative potentials of 
narrative in our teaching and research.
Hans:
The accounts that follow attempt to struggle with what Judith Butler (2004) 
has recently termed “precarious life.” Butler’s evocation of precariousness 
has layers of meaning, but principally refers to two major issues: ) the 
precariousness of critical actions in the face of fear and repression manifest 
in the world since 9/; and 2) the very precariousness of critical thought 
itself, and the veracity of representation in our struggles to acknowledge 
the Other. 
In the discussion that follows, I am concerned with precariousness as 
it pertains to our work as teacher educators. That is, how is it possible to 
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stand for and defend a strong sense of practice, when the narratives that 
might nourish practice are themselves held, at best, as irrelevant and, at 
worst, in disrepute? When I speak of “teacher education” practice in this 
context, I am referring to the multiple ways our work as teacher educators 
is layered in the contemporary university, as exemplified in the narratives 
that follow, illustrating struggles around the ethics of research, practices 
of representation, responding to the demands of cultural and other forms 
of diversity, and attempting to constitute practice as a form of practical 
judgement or wisdom.
In the ensuing narratives we attempt to foreground the importance of 
the relationship between narrative and practice. The work of Paul Ricoeur is 
helpful in exploring this relationship. In Ricoeur’s study, Oneself as Another 
(992), he links the idea of a “narrative unity of life,” which refers to the 
idea of a life project such as that of a vocation or a profession, with the 
achievement of living such a profession in terms of phronesis, which may 
be loosely translated as practical wisdom or practical judgement (Dunne, 
993). In the context of professional practices such as teaching, phronesis 
refers to living and acting ethically, to act well in terms of some sense of 
an overall good (Ricoeur, 992, p. 75). It is important to emphasize that 
this “good” is understood as something inherent in, or internal to practice, 
and not as a set of rules for practice, nor simply a composite of all the 
discrete activities we undertake in our everyday work. However, we know 
from experience that practice, in the sense of an overarching orientation to 
the good, cannot be so abstractly defined. From the perspective of practice 
as phronesis, its meaning and understanding cannot be encapsulated in 
rules, procedures and processes, as important as these might be. In other 
words, practice in the sense of phronesis is very differently understood 
and experienced than practice in a technical sense. For example, my own 
practice as a teacher and an administrator in a teacher education faculty 
cannot be fully understood only in terms of the lists of things and disparate 
actions that fill my day, nor even fully by numerical ratings I might receive 
as evaluation of my practice. 
Yet, in everyday life, while we can speak of practice in term of 
phronesis, aspects of practice are often not phronetic. Here I am referring 
to practice as a whole, as a constellation of diverse actions but oriented by 
intentionality and responsibility. While teaching in the larger sense can be 
considered in terms of phronesis (Dunne, 993), there are nonetheless—and 
necessarily so—practical activities that are technical and instrumental. Such 
activities can be conceived as part of the “unity” of practice, but may still 
be experienced as fragmentary. A common example is that as teachers or 
instructors we must submit grades and follow certain procedures required 
for all courses. While the act of assessment requires good judgement, the 
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procedures for assigning and recording grades are technical in nature. 
They must still be done well, but completing assessment of students does 
not define good teaching in totality. 
Thus, practically speaking, as Ricoeur suggests, we customarily 
experience our daily responsibilities in fragmentary, instrumental ways. 
But then to experience our work in less fragmentary ways, what is required 
is that diverse, sometimes isolated activities be gathered together in some 
fashion. The critical issue here is one of ethics—that is, understanding 
practice in terms of its ethical intentions. In other words, fragmentary 
activities in themselves cannot sustain an ethical intent and life, but require 
the mimetic function of a sustainable narrative to more generously hold 
both intention, and acknowledgement of the “Other.” This is indeed a 
difficulty, what Martha Nussbaum (1986) calls the “fragility of goodness,” 
as circumstances, events, and contingency always disturb stable spaces 
for goodness to be achieved in our work. Yet, as she notes, the exercise 
of practical wisdom cannot be retreated from in a contingent world; “the 
person of practical wisdom inhabits the human world and does not attempt 
to rise above it” (p. 34).
The challenge for those of us who work in institutions like the 
contemporary university—specifically in our case in teacher education—is 
a very complex one, then, particularly if we think of practice in terms of 
phronesis, or practical wisdom. Increasingly there is a sense in which our 
practices are experienced as fragmentary, difficult to “gather together.” 
Furthermore, some “unifying narratives” are themselves fragmentary, 
and narratives offered for the purpose of unifying practices are not able to 
sustain ethical intent. 
The context in which each of us reflects on aspects of our practice is 
specifically the institution, practice and curriculum of teacher education, 
and we ask what allows it to be experienced in other than fragmentary 
ways. In posing this question I want to acknowledge, first of all, that the 
anxieties about experiencing life in fragmentary ways are not new. Even in 
the shorter historical term (the last two centuries, for example) the notion of 
fragmentation, even if not called that, is a dominant theme in social theory 
and commentary. For the great social theorists of the late 9th century and 
early 20th century (e.g., Marx, Tonnies, Durkheim, & Weber) a primary 
concern was a social-psychological one, namely, the question of how ethical 
and responsible forms of life could be sustained in the face of fragmenting 
traditional societies, and the within the demands of the rapidly developing 
bureaucratic, industrial and scientifically oriented institutions. But while 
not a new theme, what seems necessary to ask is how fragmentation is 
understood within the very recent acceleration of globally dominant market-
oriented forms of life and practice, something we all know has impacted the 
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university and schools in some striking ways (Smith, 2000). It is within that 
context I want to think further about our work as teacher educators, and the 
challenges of fragmenting narratives that each of the following narratives 
raises in the context of specific responsibilities and interests.
As Slavoj Zizek (2005) recently notes, a critical impact of neo-
liberalism—that is, the pervasive encroachment of capitalist economic 
forms in all spheres of life—has been to further dismantle ties of obligation 
and identity. Reflecting on the example of the professions, he writes, 
The modern notion of the profession implies that I experience myself as an 
individual who is not directly “born into” his social role. What I will become 
depends on the interplay between contingent social circumstances and my 
free choice… In the specific social conditions of commodity exchange and 
the global market economy, “abstraction” becomes a direct feature of actual 
social life… The concrete existence of universality is, therefore, the individual 
without a proper place in the social edifice. (pp. 129-130)
Another way of putting this challenge is to attend to what I refer to above 
as the social-psychological problem, the way the location of our experiences 
and how we understand can, or ought to be, understood as situated within 
certain historical, cultural and social frames. The issue is, on the one hand, 
the question of what both Habermas (2003) and Riceour (992) refer to as 
“successfully being oneself” and what that means in our own current context 
and how that frames adequately more global questions of what constitutes 
the “good life.” The question in some sense is eternal, but as Habermas 
argues, it is also new, and implies a different inquiry, or at least a newly 
sustained and urgent inquiry into our lives—into an “ontology” of the 
present as Jameson (2002, p. 24) terms it. Facing the challenges of the new 
scientific and information technology, Habermas (2003) emphasizes that,
Rather, today the original philosophical question concerning the “good life” 
in all its anthropological generality appears to have taken on a new life. The 
new technologies make a public discourse on the right understanding of 
cultural forms of life in general an urgent matter. (p. 5)
Habermas’ challenge is particularly in response to the biomedical 
technologies, or what Donna Haraway (2000) has called “technoscience,” 
wherein human life and the human body have themselves become 
fragmentary sites of capitalist (re)production. Reading authors like these, I 
thought of Karl Marx’s work in the 9th century when he raised important 
questions about the process of commodification and its impact on social and 
cultural life. Marx’s analyses of work in capitalist societies are arguably 
relevant to us today, and especially to those of us who work in the university. 
Here I am not thinking so much of the economic argument, for example, 
of the increasing corporate intrusion into the university, but rather Marx’s 
analysis of alienation. Alienation, in Marxist terms, is directly related to his 
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analysis of the commodification of labour that was, in his time, increasingly 
fragmented from the notions of work and action. Under capitalism, work 
and human action become manageable parts—manageable in the sense of 
directing such labour for instrumental ends. The notion of alienation is not 
simply that one becomes divorced from the products of one’s work, but 
that the ability to respond more fully as a “successful person”—the ability 
to act ethically, to address and formulate actions in terms of the “good 
life”—becomes severely compromised as work and sense of efficacy as a 
person seems increasingly fragmented.
While the conditions in late capitalism are obviously very different, 
especially in the developed world (Jameson, 2002), there are conditions such 
as those addressed by Habermas that debilitate possibilities for selfhood and 
attaining the good life. And, I would argue, this has been exacerbated in our 
era of neo-liberal hegemony. We are experiencing this in some immediate 
ways in the university (Delbanco, 2005) and particularly within areas such 
as curriculum and teacher education. In terms of teacher education within 
the university, such developments are especially felt because historically, 
our work was marked not only by research (at least not in an instrumental 
sense), but also by responsibility and by practice (Boyer, 990); I am referring 
here to both the practice of being a teacher educator/curriculum scholar and 
to the responsibility to good practice and, more globally, the responsibility 
for education of the young in societies (Arendt, 993). 
As Arendt (1958) has written, that responsibility speaks to a kind of 
authority that is embedded in practice, and that, in its form as action is 
integrally ethical in intent. It is also what distinguishes a “professional” 
faculty and its mandate from more traditional “disciplinary” faculties in the 
university. However, faculties of education are increasingly under pressure 
to conform to the norms of such faculties, especially those in the sciences. 
What seems to be especially valorized are not necessarily the traditional 
science faculties, but the applied sciences such as engineering, technology, 
biomedics, certain branches of medicine—“technoscience” in Donna 
Haraway’s terms—where there is large funding available for research, and 
the expectation for substantial commercial returns (Delbanco, 2005).
Specifically within teacher education, the space for developing critical 
practices and for practicing forms of scholarship that may be more broadly 
defined is constrained by the emphasis on the one hand by such “market” 
forces and the break between the individual and ties of obligation (Berliner, 
2005), and also through increasing regulation of the “curriculum” of both 
schools and the universities, such that “we education professors are losing—
have lost?—control of the curriculum we teach” (Pinar, 2004, xi-xii).
The context presented only in outline above and the difficulties 
suggested for practice, especially practice understood as embodying 
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a commitment and orientation to ethical work, form the basis for the 
discussions and narratives that follow. As practitioners in teacher education, 
our practices are challenged in fundamental ways in the diverse spheres of 
our work. In the accounts below my colleagues take up the kinds of issues 
of vulnerability and precariousness that Butler (2003) suggests are now our 
lot in a world where the foundations for forms of representation, address, 
and action have become destabilized. The narratives that follow provoke 
fundamental questions about fragmentation, and how we begin to take 
responsibility within conditions of fragmentation.
The ensuing narratives ask questions of how our own work in 
storytelling may be done in truthful ways, with regard for difference, and 
in the interests of social justice. More specifically, the accounts that follow 
pose the following questions:
How might we live truthfully with others in our practices and institutions? 
How do the stories surface differences between myself and others? How do 
such differences affect my relationship with the Other?What is, or ought 
to be, the researcher’s ethical obligation in narrating difference in teaching 
practice? And what is at issue when the research itself focuses on the nature of 
difference? But where do we go from here in our work on “difference” with pre-
service teachers? Where shall we turn our attention to find a way to learn from 
the fracturing discourses that often characterize our work? How can we help 
them see the complexity of historical narratives of schooling and the way they 
situate difference? How does the past live in our present practice, theories, and 
research? And lastly, why might all this matter? Once these questions have 
been asked, how can we best honour our responsibility to act in ethical ways as 
teacher educators and as researchers?
Each of these questions is posed within the conditions of fragmentation 
raised above, but with an orientation to the question of how one might 
construe practice, not as technique but as practical wisdom; that is, they 
are posed in relation to our responsibilities, not necessarily as outcomes 
to be achieved. One of the commonalities in all the accounts is the tension 
between the demands of working in an institution and practice that values 
certain things over others and, at the same time, with the demand that we 
attend to the question of difference, and what constitutes good practice in 
teaching and research in relation to difference.
Lisa: The Ethics of “Telling Tales Out of School” How might we 
live truthfully with others in our practices and institutions?
Over the last several years I have become overtly conscious of the way in 
which I narrate my/self and the Other into the very construction of two of 
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my regularly scheduled graduate courses that deal with visuality and space. 
The stories I tell seem to hearken back to my own intended and unintended 
learning in school, and are offered up in the first class as a way to position 
my interests and desires relative to those of the course under deliberation. 
Partly I want to make my epistemological choices with regard to the readings, 
arguments, and concepts readily transparent. But I also strive to fracture the 
ubiquitous graduate narrative of course intents, the litany of descriptions 
and requirements, and to show that this course is to some extent bourn both 
from lived experience of being-in-the-world as well as from a knowledge 
of larger social structures and systems—what Himani Bannerji (995) calls 
a “situated critique.” Accordingly, I stake the first claim of the course: that 
there is no such thing as objectivity, impartiality, or disinterest. Rather, each 
of us is positioned in an intricate matrix of relations and our interpretations 
are inextricably tied to ideologically determined subjectivities. 
Narratives are always for somebody and provide “future social 
imaginaries” for us and the Other in our midst. In this case, my actions are 
designed to provoke students, early on, to unsettle the complacent and the 
comfortable—for the harsher terrain of the unfamiliar. I wish to have them 
begin to see the necessary relationships amongst narrative, difference, 
and ethics. I want to make visible the invisible conditions under which 
knowledge is produced and point out how epistemological issues are 
always part of moral deliberation, and how ethical issues are implicated 
in all analyses of knowledge (Code, 99). It is no small thing for me to tell 
these stories, for as Thomas King (2003) reminds us, “once a story is told, it 
cannot be called back. Once told, it is loose in the world” (p.0). One of the 
stories—and there are a number of variations—goes like this: 
My family came to Canada (Toronto more precisely) when I was 8 years old and 
my brother was 7. Without any previous knowledge of the language, we were 
both put back a year and placed in what was then called the “New Canadians” 
class. There were approximately 8 or 9 children in that class who hailed from 
all parts of the globe—we were united by our marginalization, our silences, 
and oftentimes, our fears. Without the rudiments of the English language, I 
learned to “read” Canadian schooling, society, and culture through the spaces 
in which I walked, the artifacts, symbols, and images on my school’s walls. 
I was very good at this, in part because I had already spent the majority 
of my childhood looking and interpreting. As a child, no doubt like many 
other Greek children, I spent an exorbitant amount of time gazing upon the 
narrative imagery depicted on the walls of a Greek Orthodox Church. Avid 
churchgoers, my mother and grandmother attended—with us in tow—every 
Sunday service, every high and low religious holiday, every observance of 
a Saint’s birth, death, and miraculous deeds. As the liturgy is chanted, to 
this day in archaic Byzantine language, most of what is said is completely 
incomprehensible to a child, so my gaze would wander over the visual 
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imagery around me. I was grateful when the inevitable boredom set in that 
gazing around you was not frowned upon, but rather, subtly encouraged as a 
powerful form of curriculum. 
This early skill at visual interpretation would come in very handy in my 
contemplation and understanding of the meanings of school, teacher, and 
education. In our first couple of weeks at William Burgess School, my brother 
and I found ourselves outside the principal’s office. Looking up at the wall 
immediately opposite the office, I was drawn to a photograph portrait of a 
well-dressed lady with a crown and lots of jewellery. After a time, I asked 
my brother, “Who is that lady up there?” My brother, always happy to oblige 
with an answer—right, wrong, or nebulous—looked at me confidently and 
assuredly pronounced: “Oh! That’s the principal’s wife. He likes to keep up 
that picture of her so he can think about her during the day, when he’s at 
school.” Of course the woman in the photograph was Queen Elizabeth, but in 
that moment and in an imaginative act my brother had tried, as King (2003) 
phrases it, “to set the world straight” (p. 60).
Of late these stories have become troubling for me as I seek to understand 
not why I narrate these stories but how I narrate them. I want to reflect on 
how these stories are shaped—altered, transformed, and embellished—
relative to my student audience and what effects they serve to construct in 
their learning and in my pedagogy, and in my own shaping as a woman, 
teacher and researcher. I want to fracture my own narrative practices in 
the classroom, as a way to make sense of how the educational experiences 
we relate serve to construct and mediate difference, and to question why 
they call forth our care and our ethical consideration. More broadly, I 
consider the “educational stories” we all tell in our classrooms and wonder 
provocatively: Does the educational story make the educator? 
My inquiry into the nature of these narrative tales is prompted 
by my desire to live ethically in the classroom with my students and 
to problematize the strict hierarchical relations that so often exist in 
university classrooms. I want to situate myself “as part of the whole,” not 
in opposition to my students. And while I understand the complexity of 
power and differential interests, and all that is called forth in each of our 
interactions in the classroom, I endeavour to live and learn alongside my 
students, charting our oftentimes difficult and chaotic allegiances and 
understandings in the world. Ultimately, as Rita Irwin (2003) has noted, 
“cultivating an appreciative way of knowing is an act of cultivating an 
aesthetic way of knowing, an aesthetic that values awareness, perceptual 
acuity, attunement, wonderment, novelty, and emergence” (p. 63).
As a result of these intents, certain tensions are created that are difficult 
to resolve. Having said that, the contextual conditions of each classroom 
mediate how well these aspirations and understandings are realized 
and negotiated within that particular given place/time. These stories 
9Fragmenting Narratives
LUND, PANAYOTIDIS, SMITS, & TOWERS
constitute the warp and weft of my cross-cultural experience of school life 
in an unfamiliar space/country. In some ways I never tire of telling these 
stories but I also know that I am driven by these stories. I have often asked 
myself: What sort of dichotomies do I set in place? How do I smooth the 
fragmented narrative and emotional distress of my schooling experience 
through humour? Katharine Smithrim (2003) has eloquently discussed 
the importance of being emotional in the classroom as a way in which 
students and instructor can forge “an experience of engagement” (p. 60).
Furthermore, how do I impose a narrative arc of “success” and “progress”? 
How do I come to ennoble the immigrant child who was able to subvert 
the structures, policies, and practices of Canadian schooling—constructing 
in the process what cultural theorists would call centre-margins relations. 
Do my immigrant narratives construct me as the subject—“speak me into 
existence” as Judith Butler might say? Who am I without these stories? 
How do the stories surface differences between myself and others? How do such 
differences affect my relationship with the Other?
Jo: The Ethics of Narrating Difference in Teaching Practice
As I began to think about the theme of difference in general and these 
questions in particular, I was drawn to an ethical dilemma facing me in 
my research practice. One of my current research projects focuses on the 
relationship between the way teachers hold their mathematical knowledge 
and the nature of their mathematical practices in the classroom—in 
other words, on their knowing in action.2 As the research has progressed I 
have found myself struggling with the ethics of “telling the story” of the 
teachers’ work, of describing teachers’ practices in ways that respect the 
realities and contingencies of classroom and school life and that honour 
each teacher’s contribution to my research while provoking, for the teacher 
and the research community, dissonance between accepted and alternative 
teaching practices. This struggle is a constant presence for me as I immerse 
myself in the many hours of data I have collected in my own and others’ 
classrooms and as I begin to tease out ideas, patterns, and themes and 
wrestle with the discordance between what I and other teachers say we 
believe and what we actually enact in our classroom practices.
In struggling with this dilemma I have been drawn to Aristotle’s 
notion of phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis is fundamentally about 
living and acting ethically, though in daily life many of our practices are 
not phronetic. “Phronesis requires an interaction between the general and 
the concrete; it requires consideration, judgment, and choice. More than 
anything else, phronesis requires experience [italics in original]” (Flyvberg, 
200, p.57), but it is precisely my experience as a teacher that is causing me 
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to read my data as both a teacher and a researcher. Negotiating the distance 
(Picard, 2002) between these two roles is indeed the work of the teacher-
researcher.
I want to offer here one example of the deep difficulty inherent in 
attempting to negotiate the distance between teacher and researcher. On 
occasion—actually more often than just occasionally—I come across an 
article describing a teacher’s practice in less than favourable ways. Here 
are just a few excerpts from one such example that draws on a study of 
two teachers’ work with elementary students in mathematics. The author 
juxtaposes Ms. Carter’s and Ms. Andrew’s teaching of fractions like this:
Unlike Ms. Carter, Ms. Andrew did not ask her students to justify why they 
chose a particular partitioning strategy. Instead, Ms. Andrew often asked 
questions that required a show of hands or yes-no responses.... Ms. Andrew 
wanted to engage her students in the activity and to see if they understood, but 
the questions she asked yielded general responses without revealing specific 
information about the students’ thinking. (Kazemi, 1998, p. 412)
Both teachers wanted their students to learn from their mistakes, but Ms. 
Andrew often supplied the conceptual thinking for her students. In Ms. Carter’s 
class, inadequate solutions served as entry points for further mathematical 
discussion. (Kazemi, 1998, p. 413)
Neither the students nor Ms. Carter belittled, penalized, or discredited 
anyone who made a mistake. The atmosphere of mutual respect between the 
students and Ms. Carter allowed the class to think about and build conceptual 
understandings eagerly.Ms. Andrew treated errors differently. (Kazemi, 1998, 
p. 43)
When I read such an account of less-than-adequate teaching, especially 
when it is juxtaposed as it was in this article by a description of “good” 
teaching by another teacher, I am compelled to pause and wonder what the 
“Ms. Andrews” of this world must think when they read these descriptions. 
Does the account come as a surprise? If not the account, what about the 
comparison and the surrounding analysis? 
Such moments of discomfort give me pause for thought, and yet there 
is something in the power of example, as Aristotle knew well. The teachers 
who invite me into their classrooms understand that they will be, one way 
or another, re-constituted into “examples,” and all of them, having been 
either my erstwhile students or party to instances of my work in professional 
development over the years, know that I use videotaped examples from my 
own teaching as teaching tools, often specifically choosing instances of my 
own less-than-stellar teaching as a means to open up discussion of what 
I now view as inadequate practice. Each teacher with whom I conduct 
research has given me permission to use excerpts from the videotapes of 
their teaching in my ongoing teacher education work, and some have been 
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present on occasions where their teaching has been shown to others in such 
forums. It is a different matter, however, for me to hold out examples from 
my own teaching as being in need of improvement than to do the same 
with another teacher’s practices. I tend to be much more brutal with my 
own examples.
Nevertheless, I continue to struggle with the researcher’s ethical charge 
to “do no harm.” While we may be instructed by the differences of which 
we are informed concerning Ms. Carter’s and Ms. Andrew’s teaching 
practices, and therefore we may assume that a general “good” is being 
done, I wonder what Ms. Andrew has learned from her experience as 
part of this research and whether she feels “good” about her portrayal? 
I console myself by thinking that perhaps Ms. Andrew was the one 
pushing for change in her own classroom (though no hint of this is given 
in the article), or that perhaps she was secure enough in her practice to be 
unconcerned by an outsider’s view, although this is at once comforting and 
troublesome. Perhaps Ms. Andrew recognises, as Derrida reminds us, that 
the Other can never be “captured” through social categories or designative 
names (Butler, 2004). But I am troubled still by the recognition that how 
we choose to frame the Other speaks volumes about us, and I recognise 
the power of my narratives to transform others and myself. Indeed, the 
irony is not lost on me that in exposing this dilemma of research practice 
by bringing under scrutiny another researcher’s writing, I am engaging in 
the very practice I am seeking to disrupt. Nevertheless, I am curious about 
the decisions this author made in choosing examples from the data and 
in juxtaposing two teachers’ practices in this way, and this provokes me 
to wonder: What gives me the authority to act through my research—to 
propose ideas and make judgements under cover of a word processor—in 
ways that would make me uncomfortable if I were to speak the ideas aloud 
before an audience, especially if that audience included the teacher who is 
anonymously portrayed in the writing? 
Indeed, this is a dilemma I with which I am struggling in the research 
project I mentioned earlier, as I work with a colleague to understand and 
write about the growth of mathematical understanding in one particular 
teacher’s classroom. As we have analysed the classroom data, we have 
started to recognise that the particular theoretical lens we are bringing is 
surfacing questions for us about the teacher’s practice and these questions 
have started to coalesce into a critique. The lens we have brought is that 
of complexity theory, which has prompted us to analyse the classroom 
discourse from the perspective of the collective. Through the complexity 
theory lens, aspects of the teacher’s practice have emerged as problematic. 
However, this critique is simply meaningless when one focuses on the 
data without the theoretical lens of complexity theory and without the 
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perspective of the collective. It was only when our attention turned away 
from the fragmentary and the individual and towards the collective 
processes at play in the classroom that we began to critique the teaching 
we observed more vigorously. This leaves for me the dilemma of how to 
broach such critiques with the teacher, whose work I respect and whose 
trust has been placed in me. How shall I talk to her about the differences 
between her practice and practices suggested by emerging theories in 
mathematics education?
What is, or ought to be, the researcher’s ethical obligation in narrating difference 
in teaching practice? And what is at issue when the research itself focuses on the 
nature of difference?
Darren: The Ethics of Narrating Difference in Antiracism 
Research
To conduct social justice research and activism in Canada means to 
disrupt the narrative flow of a fragile national identity that springs from a 
comfortable tale of collaboration and consensus. For this identity is founded 
on a sweeping and magnificent lie, like a colourful blanket thrown over the 
broken bodies of the silenced victims of its effects. Its captivating narrative 
is woven from the carefully selected textbook images, pre-packaged 
curricula, and intricately coded public discourse of a nation. Bringing up 
racism means pointing out the flaws and seams in the weave. 
Stuart Hall (992) explains how the concept of racism serves to create 
and reinforce the barriers that divide people:
Racism, of course, operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries 
between racially constituted categories, and its typically binary system 
of representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalize the 
difference between belongingness and otherness. (p. 255)
Even to mention racism by name, or to acknowledge its existence in every 
community, structure, and institution, is to fracture the smooth image of a 
cohesive, multicultural society.
Current research on challenging racism is complicated by the pervasive 
but erroneous notion that Canada has always stood for harmony and 
acceptance. John Boyko (995) notes our national tendency toward 
whitewashing our racist past: “Canadians are often guilty of ignoring or 
warping our past while sanctimoniously feeling somewhat removed from, 
and superior to, countries struggling with racial problems and harbouring 
histories marked by slavery or racial violence” (p. 5). Even reported 
activities of contemporary racist hate groups in Canada are typically 
downplayed or avoided in schools and universities (Kinsella, 200). My 
personal experiences with racist hate mail, telephone threats, and lawsuits 
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launched by extremists have revealed to me a sense of the depth and dangers 
of this lethal undercurrent of hate.Admittedly, the very topic of difference—
arguably the currency of antiracism work—is itself a concept that attracts a 
great deal of heated academic debate and drawing of lines. Where the lines 
drawn are racial, the discourse can boil over. Hall (992) notes that difference 
is “a slippery, and therefore, contested concept,” clarifying that “there is the 
‘difference’ which makes a radical and unbridgeable separation: and there 
is a ‘difference’ which is positional, conditional and conjunctural, closer 
to Derrida’s notion of différance” [italics in original]. What is needed, he 
argues, is a “decoupling” of ethnicity and difference—too often defined by 
white nationalism—from the violence of the state (p. 257). He was writing 
about the situation in the United Kingdom but his words ring just as true 
in the Canadian setting.
My recent research with students and teachers undertaking the thorny 
work of tackling racism in school settings3 (Lund, 2003a, 2003b) has drawn 
a sharper focus on the strength of mainstream Canada’s propensity for 
denial, and the barriers this can present to those undertaking social justice 
initiatives. Tackling some of the destructive responses to difference—such 
as white privilege, patriarchy, homophobia, classism, sexism, racism, and 
oppression—in their various forms in schools and the community means 
fracturing the thin veneer of social harmony. But I am coming to see that 
this fracturing is an inevitable, and perhaps even desirable, first step on the 
journey toward a more equitable society.
An additional source of discord in educational research emerges 
from the various identities within which we conduct our work. Dei, 
Karumanchery and Karumanchery-Luik (2004) assert that our national 
and cultural identities are not fixed but intersect within a shifting terrain 
of meanings and negotiations. In spite of this fluidity, some national 
images seem cemented; for example, “because Western cultures are most 
commonly equated with whiteness, in these contexts, racialized bodies are 
formed and negotiated as inherently unequal and certainly less desirable 
than their white counterparts” (p. 42). Antiracism research requires 
confronting these and other discomforting inequities.
Whether antiracism activism takes place in faculty hiring meetings, 
lectures, staff rooms, or school hallways, this work has the effect of 
interrupting the shared fictional narrative of a nation purportedly built 
on harmonious cooperation between different peoples. Countering the 
denial of our racist historical past and the inequities of our present through 
social justice activism is an effort to strip away the whitewash—so to 
speak—revealing a new problematic narrative for Canada that many find 
troubling. As Roxanna Ng (2003) notes, “undoing inequality and achieving 
equity in education is a risky and uncomfortable act because we need to 
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disrupt the way things are ‘normally’ done. This involves a serious (and 
frequently threatening) effort to interrogate our privilege as well as our 
powerlessness” (p. 26). Articulating this new, discordant narrative into 
teacher education and educational research has an unsettling effect on 
many participants. This backlash to particular antiracism initiatives in 
teacher education has been documented recently in a study of the negative 
reactions of white Canadian pre-service teachers to a classic article on white 
privilege (Solomon, Portelli, Daniel, & Campbell, 2005). 
In my own efforts to insert contentious topics into teacher education, 
I find myself using self-effacing humour and an awkward form of “guilty 
white male confessional” to mask my own discomfort. I have heard myself 
lapsing into a sort of “redemptive” narrative, a version of my own life story 
that highlights my being raised in a working class neighbourhood with 
a racist father. Most often, when I first raise the issue of white privilege 
among mainstream education students, the response is anger or, at the 
very least, emotional defensiveness and denial. I have come to believe that 
these are promising signs that the necessary fracturing has begun. 
But where do we go from here in our work on “difference” with pre-service teachers? 
Where shall we turn our attention to find a way to learn from the fracturing 
discourses that often characterize our work?
Lisa:
Significantly, it is my historical research practice that has allowed me to 
question the stories I relate in class and to wonder: How might my musings 
on these educational stories inform my research practice in due time? 
And how might it enhance my attunement to difference and to ethical 
considerations in historical interpretation and analysis? 
As a historian I am always conscious of the narratives I encounter in 
my research and particularly how I choose to interpret them. I understand 
that “the past as history will be necessarily configured, troped, emplotted, 
read, mythologized and ideologized in ways to suit ourselves” (Jenkins, 
99, p. 3). I am ever vigilant of how narratives are constituted as forms 
of argumentation that intertwine past/present and self/other. “Narrative 
and argumentation are dialectically related,” notes David Kaplan (200), 
and “each is part of a whole and needs the other to be complete” (n.p.).
Historians interpret the same phenomenon differently through 
discourses that are always on the move always de-composed and re-
composed, always positioned and positioning, and which thus need 
constant self-examination as discourses by those who use them. Since 
they construct their understandings laterally—that is, moving from one 
set of sources after another—they effectively do comparative work. They 
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do not move down into deeper and deeper knowledge. At the root is the 
perpetual quest for the truth and the assertion that “evidence is in the 
record.” After Jenkins, I prefer Edward Carr’s explanation that “the trace 
becomes evidence when it is used to support an argument (interpretation) 
prior to which, although it exists, it remains just an unused piece of stuff 
from the past” (as cited in Jenkins, 99, p. 49).
Accordingly, I employ “unused pieces of stuff from the past” at the 
beginning of each course by fracturing narratives and confounding our 
notion of difference, reminding my students, and myself, that the world/the 
past comes to us always already as stories. We cannot get out of these stories 
(narratives) to check if they correspond to the real/world/past because 
these “already constructed narratives constitute reality” (Jenkins, 99, p. 
9). I encourage them to think critically about how they try to know the past 
and why this might matter? As David Lowenthal (999) has insightfully 
elucidated “whether it is celebrated or rejected, attended to or ignored, the 
past is omnipresent” (p. xv). This is crucial in determining the possibilities 
of what “history” is and can be—it is history’s “claim to knowledge” rather 
than belief or assertion that makes it the discourse it is.
Drawing on feminist conceptions of difference as a political act, one 
that has fundamental implications for how individuals (self and other) and 
societies can live, develop, and transform themselves—I seek to vindicate 
difference as a powerful factor of dissymmetry that rejects dualisms and 
recasts difference, narrative and ethics symbiotically in the classroom 
and in research. There is no justice in the world without accepting and 
understanding the richness and power differences inherent in the world. 
As Sandra Harding (1998) has noted, it is a question of reinventing oneself 
as Other. While my students grasp the particularities of my own alienated 
and marginal school experience, I need to keep questioning.
How can we help them see the complexity of historical narratives of schooling and 
the way they situate difference? How does the past live in our present practice, 
theories, and research? And lastly, why might all this matter?
Darren:
Teaching is a conservative profession; the workforce is comprised mainly of 
white people, and most of us liked our schools, thrived within their visible 
and invisible hierarchies, and so we unconsciously strive to recreate and 
protect them in our own practice. The resistance of Canadian educators 
to antiracism initiatives has been well documented (Fleras, 996; Solomon 
& Levine-Rasky, 994). From their national study of over 000 teachers, 
Solomon and Levine-Rasky (994) concluded, not surprisingly, that 
Canadian educators consistently seek to avoid contentious issues around 
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difference, and specifically that “denial and reluctance to name the problem 
of racism and thus the need for an antiracist pedagogy remains a most 
tenacious obstacle” (p. 12). It is significant that a decade later, their recent 
research confirms that “anti-racism pedagogy has been slow in achieving 
the objective of equalizing opportunities for racial and ethnic minorities 
because of educators’ ambivalence, contradictory responses, or outright 
antagonism to its concept, policy and practice” (Solomon & Levine-Rasky, 
2003, p. 9). Facing the hatred and discrimination is uncomfortable, but can 
open the way to a more critical examination of the mistakes of the past, and 
more importantly, how they can be stopped from repeating themselves.
Since European settlers began arriving here, systematic discrimination 
has been practiced against individuals and groups based on racist 
ideologies and ethnocentric views about the primacy of British cultural 
norms, beginning with the colonization of First Nations peoples. Official 
government policies, formulated and implemented with popular public 
support, served to entrench, among other examples, racial segregation 
in schools, forced assimilation of First Nations Canadians, racialized 
immigration restrictions, anti-Semitism, the mistreatment of Chinese 
immigrant railway workers, and the displacement and internment of 
Japanese-Canadians (Boyko, 995; Henry, Tator, Mattis, & Rees, 995; Ward, 
1992). Exposing and studying this past is an important first step for all 
Canadians, and Jennifer Tupper’s (2002) work on racialized representation 
in contemporary social studies textbooks offers an important exemplar to 
point the way.
I am learning to find strength in unstable narratives, comfort in the 
awkward recognition of differences, and hope in the fracturing of smooth 
surfaces. Daniel Yon’s (2000) poignant observation about the young people 
who were the focus of his study offers promise in the fluidity of their 
multiple identities. He warns: “The desire to know cultures, races, and 
identities as stable objects detracts from the possibility of engaging with the 
multiple identifications and affiliations which we have seen are central to 
the ways that identities, race, and culture are made and lived by youth” (p. 
32). Conducting antiracism research means to choose to interrupt a false 
story, to ask uncomfortable questions about power and privilege, to open 
up new negotiations about identity and difference. This means walking a 
rocky terrain that offers scant refuge and demands continuous effort just 
to move forward. 
Once these questions have been asked, how can we best honour our responsibility 
to act in ethical ways as teacher educators and as researchers?
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Jo:
As a researcher in a professional faculty I have an obligation not only to 
describe and account for various teaching practices, but also to challenge 
accepted practices and to make judgements—to stand for something. In 
this sense, one acts phronetically, in Aristotle’s sense of the word, when one 
considers one’s relationship to society when one acts. Society here includes 
not only individual teachers who might be embarrassed by accounts of 
their practice but also other teachers seeking to improve their practices, 
parents seeking alternatives to deadening school systems, and indeed the 
children who might find themselves in “Ms. Andrew’s” class. By contrast, 
“Foucault... talks about ethics in relation to ‘an aesthetic of existence,’ that 
is, the relationship you have to yourself [italics in original] when you act 
(Flyvberg, 200, p. 55). Such an ethic compels me to confront the differences 
I perceive between myself as a teacher (and researcher) and the Other 
as teacher, including those other teachers in whose classrooms I do my 
research. I am compelled to reconsider whether those differences I perceive 
are as “real” as I think they are. Maturana (1988) suggests that “we accept 
or [do] not accept... responsibility for our actions... according to whether we 
are aware or not of our constitutive participation in the bringing forth of the 
reality that we live at each instant” (p. 73). Such a position suggests that we 
are always and already implicated in the “reality” we are witnessing when 
we observe teaching, and that we are in part responsible for occasioning 
the very practice we are documenting, critiquing, and from which might 
like to think we are—philosophically, theoretically and perhaps ethically—
setting ourselves apart. 
As we act, then, we must honour and remain alive to the practice of 
criticism (Butler, 2004) but maintain sensitivity in our encounters with the 
Other. After all, as Derrida again insists, the Other is “one to whom an 
incalculable responsibility is owed... [and therefore] one to whom a certain 
response is owed (Butler, 2004, p. 32). And here I am back where I began: 
What ought to be the nature of my response to the teaching practices I 
research?
Sustaining ethical practice in research on teaching remains a delicate 
affair. Choosing how to act is messier, more contingent, and more context-
specific than many research methodology texts would have us believe. 
Borrowing from Maturana and Varela (992) I suggest that sustaining 
ethical practice in narrating difference is dependent on, though not determined 
by, the nature of our relationship to the Other.
And so a question persists: How ought we, in our research practices, to do justice 
to a life?
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Hans:
The preceding narratives are intended to illustrate and interpret the 
question of fragmentation, and especially what would allow or disallow 
an ethics of narrating difference. Here, as mentioned at the outset, the work 
of the hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur (992) may be helpful, and 
his exploration of the relationship between “the self and the ethical aim.” 
What is valuable in his discussion is that the ethical aim, as it were, cannot 
simply be reduced to individual wants and desires and interests, but 
must indeed rest in something other. It is within his formulation of ethical 
intention as “aiming at the good life with and for others in just institutions” 
that I wish to frame the narratives of my colleagues. And I want to argue 
that Ricoeur, while not giving us an immediate solution to fragmentation, 
perhaps points to alternative ways of construing narratives that bring us 
back to some sense of ethical purpose and unity, as I noted earlier may be 
integral to the work of teacher education and curriculum. I reiterate below 
the questions around how we can be “successful” persons within the desire 
to achieve a good life, or to strive for the good through our practices within 
the context of teacher education and research.
“Aiming at the good life” (Ricoeur, 992, p. 7) 
Nel Noddings (2003) has asked recently why it has become so unfashionable, 
or even prohibitive to talk about the “aims of education.” I would take 
her question to parallel Ricoeur’s discussion about the good life as ethical 
intent, which constitutes the aim of our responsibilities as teachers and 
researchers. There are two points in this: first, that the “good” is never 
totally achievable and therefore cannot be held by narrow and finite 
definitions of outcomes; and secondly, Ricoeur restates Aristotle’s notion 
that basis for the good life lies in praxis. But praxis has a different meaning 
than merely technique. 
For example, when we talk about standards of excellence, whether they 
are in our research approaches, our construction of narratives about our 
lives, or how we take up the issue of difference, such standards cannot be 
reduced to instructional outcomes or procedures, although they are often 
presented this way. While those procedures, steps and techniques certainly 
have their place—they are fragments, in this sense, of narratives and 
practices—they cannot replace practice nor praxis in a more constitutive 
sense (i.e., What does it mean to be a teacher? What does it mean to be a 
researcher?). Hence, standards of excellence require the kind of gathering 
up that requires both a sense of the good life and, more critically, shared 
understandings and dialogue. When a person acts ethically in this sense, 
it is not just on the basis of individual choice, or on that part of our work 
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that is demanded through narrow outcomes, but more broadly through 
what Ricoeur argues is an interpretive relationship with the Other, with 
multiple narratives—texts of action—of how we conduct ourselves in the 
world, then, provide possibilities as well for the self and for understanding 
the other. 
“With and for others…” Ricoeur (1992, p. 180) 
Ricoeur raises the question of what makes it possible to engage in ethical 
action, what makes us capable of ethics. In a fragmented context, ethics may 
only be reduced to one’s instrumental relationships to things and others. 
Even the Other (or understanding the Other, others’ narratives, or others’ 
differences) is seen as a problem to be solved. In construing our educational 
and research work in such forms we may fall into a kind of narrow self-
realization, and certainly, a narrower sense of what it means to be a self 
as teacher or researcher. Knowledge then becomes something different, 
something less attached, than knowledge oriented to understanding.
Ricoeur raises the important idea that to be a self is, in some ways, 
impossible without what he calls the “mediating” role of the Other—that 
it is the Other who mediates the possibilities “between capacities and 
realization.” He writes about the relationship as one of solicitude, a relationship 
open to the suffering of others, with suffering here not necessarily referring 
to physical or emotional pain, but to the degree of capacity for action, for 
taking up the world more fully, for better understanding. He writes,
For from the suffering other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn 
from the power of acting and existing but precisely from weakness itself. 
This is perhaps the supreme test of solicitude, when unequal power finds 
compensation in an authentic reciprocity in exchange, which in the hour of 
agony, finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or the feeble embrace of 
clasped hands. (992, p. 9)
What Ricoeur is raising here is what summons us to responsibility, a 
question Judith Butler (2003) re-emphasizes in her book, Pecarious Life: The 
Powers of Mourning and Violence, where she reminds us of the precariousness 
of all representations or attempts at representation. It is a reminder that we 
find ethical intent, or the “good life,” not in lofty academic plans, or good 
lessons, or outcomes, or neat ethical proposals for research, but in a form 
of narrative that finds its fragile roots in our need for friends and for the 
well-being of both others and ourselves.
“In Just Institutions …” Ricoeur (992, p. 94) 
Ricoeur defines institution as “the structure of living together as this 
belongs to a historical community” (p. 94). It is a structure not reducible 
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to interpersonal relationships, or our immediate everyday practices, 
yet integral to them. It provides what he terms an ethos—from which 
ethics takes its name—something that gives common rule, and common 
constraints. Ricoeur’s discussion of just institutions is important for 
thinking about fragmentation in this way: he raises the critical questions 
about understanding in the first instance, plurality—that is, the idea that 
the other cannot be reduced to the same—and yet at the same time, the 
ability to hold what he terms “action in concert” (p. 96).
Returning to the points I raised earlier about Marx’s notion of 
alienation, one can see that part of the problem is that first of all, difference 
is easily erased when work is determined and recognized solely in terms of 
quantifiable (and hence also interchangeable) elements. If, for instance, our 
preparation of student teachers is only for the purposes of meeting narrowly 
defined and discrete “standards” of teaching, then what may effectively be 
erased is the question of who a person is and what he or she can bring 
to work; and practice defined in such standards cannot hold “excellence” 
since excellence requires a strong and shared narrative of action and one 
that offers possibility for self-understanding and becoming.
Additionally, in fragmented forms, teaching as work cannot only 
be individually conceived, but indeed requires “action in concert.” In a 
situation of fragmentation, it becomes all too easy to consider the Other 
as a thing. Ricoeur makes the interesting point that institutions can only 
thrive on some basis of equality, by which he means that we must treat 
every person as an “each.” Equality here refers to where solicitude lives, as 
a deep regard and responsibility for the Other as other, and not as a product 
of a process of practices unencumbered by a broader sense of intention and 
purpose.
Hence, to return to our theme of narrative differences in fragmentary 
contexts, in taking up our responsibilities as an effort that aims for phronesis, 
we cannot assume the stability of guiding master narratives, or even secure 
or hospitable institutions. But the struggle to frame our questions and 
practices as orienting to addressing differences and respects do require 
more than simply carrying out our work in the assumption that we have 
achieved good practice. As Alexander (997) suggests in his reading of 
Gadamer’s view, when we risk the self to express goodwill to—or solicititude 
for—the Other, we may begin to create more hospitable conditions for our 
practice.
Notes
1.  A modified version of this paper was presented as a series of narrations at 
“Provoking Curriculum: To Promote a New Era of Canadian Curriculum 
Questioning,” a symposium of the Canadian Association of Curriculum 
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Studies, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC (Lund, Panayotidis, Phelan, Smits, 
& Towers, 2003). The authors have tried to capture the polyvocal quality of the 
presentation by maintaining their individual voices. A series of visual images 
was projected as a backdrop to the original presentation, a few of which are 
included here to elicit further insights into the meanings conveyed and evoked 
by our writing. These selected images are used with the kind permission of the 
artists. Click HERE to access the images.
2.  This research is supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council (# 40-200-0500)
3.  This research has been supported by grants from the Killam Trusts and 
SSHRC.
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